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SOCIAL SECURITY AND HOUSEHOLD
WEALTH ACCUMULATION: NEW
MICROECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE
Martin Feldstein and Anthony Pellechio*
T HE social security programwill pay benefits
of more than $100 billion in 1978.1 Public
transfers on this scale are large enough to have
profound effects on the behavior of the U.S.
economy. The most important effect, although
not the only one, is likely to be the impact of
social security on private saving and aggregate
capital accumulation. The present paper contrib-
utes to the analysis of this issue by providing new
evidence on the extent to which the accumula-
tion of wealth by individual households responds
to differences in social security benefits.
I. Social Security and Saving: The Theoretical
Indeterminacy
The traditional life cycle model implies that an
actuarially fair social security program unam-
biguously reduces private saving. Within a more
general framework, however, the effect of social
security on saving is theoretically indeterminate.
Only econometric evidence can determine the
extent to which social security decreases saving.
Before turning to our new evidence, it is worth
examining the sources of the theoretical indeter-
minacy.
Consider first the effect of social security in the
traditional life cycle model in which the time
pattern of work and labor income is exogenously
fixed. In this situation, social security can alter
the time pattern of consumption only if it changes
the household's lifetime budget constraint. Since
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The social security program is technically three separate
programs of old age and survivors insurance, disability insur-
ance, and health insurance for the aged (Medicare). General
retirement, survivors and disability benefits alone will exceed
$100 billion.
an actuarially fair social security program leaves
the budget constraint unchanged, there is also no
change in each year's consumption. The social
security tax that is paid each year therefore re-
duces private saving by an equal amount. For an
actuarially fair social security program, this is
equivalent to reducing the personal wealth ac-
cumulated before retirement by the actuarial
present value of future benefits.2
It has been common in discussions of social
security policy to reject this picture of rational
life cycle saving.3 Individuals are instead viewed
as myopic nonplanners who save in a haphazard
way or not at all; as a result of such myopia, the
introduction of social security would have no
offsetting effect on private saving.4 We agree that
there are some individuals for whom this picture
of irrational saving behavior is an appropriate
description but we do not believe that such be-
havior is universal or even typical. Irrational sav-
ing behavior among part of the population would
reduce the effect of social security on private
saving but would not eliminate it.5 The econo-
metric evidence presented below gives no sup-
port to the view that such irrationality is very
widespread.
The extended life cycle model presented in
Feldstein (1974, 1977) showed a quite different
reason why individual life cycle saving might not
be decreased and might actually be increased by
the introduction or increase of social security
benefits. The essential feature of the extended
life cycle model is that retirement and saving
decisions are made jointly. Any exogenous van-
2Theresult is shown graphically for the two-period life
cycle model in Feldstein (1974) and derived explicitly in
Feldstein (1977).
See, for example, Myers (1965), Pechman et al. (1968),
Schulz (1974), and Diamond (1977).
Some have even suggested that the provision of social
security may actually cause some individuals to save more
because it serves as a reminder of the need to provide for old
age. See Katona (1965) and Pechman et al. (1968).
The irrational saving behavior of a small fraction of the
population might justify a compulsory saving program even if
it had a small aggregate effect on saving. This is a quite
separate question that will not be examined in this paper.
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able can thus influence saving indirectly by alter-
ing retirement. Social security is likely to induce
earlier retirement and the resulting increase in
the expected period of retirement will, as such,
increase total saving during preretirement years.
The net effect of social security on saving in this
extended life cycle model is ambiguous. Whether
and to what extent social security reduces saving
depends on the relative strength of the traditional
"wealth replacement effect" and the countervail-
ing "induced retirement effect."6
Even if we disregard the effect of social secu-
rity on retirement, there are at least four reasons
why rational savers might not regard social secu-
rity wealth and private fungible wealth as perfect
substitutes.7 First, social security provides an
annuity rather than a fixed sum at retirement and,
even before price indexing was formally incorpo-
rated, adjusted benefits for rising prices. Because
of this "real annuity" character of social secu-
rity, individuals might reasonably regard a dollar
of social security wealth as a substitute for more
than a dollar's worth of fungible assets. Second,
social security benefits are not a contractual obli-
gation of the government but are determined by
legislation.8 Pessimists might therefore underes-
timate the value of social security wealth while
optimists overestimate it. Third, social security
is not an actuarially fair program, but alters
lifetime budget constraints; such changes in real
lifetime resources will alter consumption and
saving.9 Fourth, the introduction of social secu-
rity (or a change in an existing program) may
cause offsetting changes in private intergenera-
tional transfers, thereby reducing the depressing
effect of social security on private saving.10
6 See Feldstein (1977) for a formal derivation of this.
We define 'social security wealth" as the present actua-
rial value of future social security benefits. The adjective
"fungible" is used to distinguish household wealth as tradi-
tionally defined from the total household wealth. The calcula-
tion of social security wealth is discussed in section III below
and in Feldstein (1974).
8 Until 1972 the law made no provision for future increases
in the schedule of social security benefits. Increases occurred
frequently, but required explicit acts of Congress.
This important aspect is developed in Kotlikoff et al.
(1977).
IS This idea is developed by Barro (1974) and Miller and
Upton (1974). Our econometric evidence deals only partially
with this issue. In particular, our evidence does not preclude
the possibility that the existence of social security tax
liabilities on future generations could cause every household
to raise its savings while the existence of benefits for the
current generation of workers causes differential reduction in
In this paper, we analyze a cross section of
households and find that differences in future
social security benefits cause differences in ordi-
nary saving. It should go without saying that no
single econometric study can ever be conclusive.
The current research should be seen as an áddi-
tion to a growing body of new evidence on the
effect of social security on the accumulation of
wealth.11
II. The Econometric Specification
The present study uses individual household
observations to estimate the effect of social secu-
rity on the amount of wealth that individuals
accumulate by the end of the normal working
life. The specification of our econometric equa-
tion focuses on the stock of accumulated wealth
rather than the annual flow of saving. The current
section discusses our specification and the in-
terpretation of the parameters in more detail.
It is useful to begin with the relation between
labor income and accumulated individual wealth
that is predicted by the traditional life cycle
model in the absence of any social security. In its
most general form, the traditional life cycle
model implies only that each individual accumu-
lates wealth during his working years to finance
consumption during retirement; further restric-
tions are needed to specify an econometric equa-
tion. Under the assumption that all individuals
have the same tastes with respect to consump-
tion at different ages, that each individual's net-
of-tax labor income has its own level but grows at
the same exponential rate, and that intended be-
quests are either nonexistent or proportional to
the present value of the individual's labor in-
come, the traditional life cycle model implies that
in any age cohort the value of each individual's
savings. The direct evidence on the value of bequests by low
and middle income families is, however, contrary to the pre-
diction of the Barro-Miller-Upton theory. For a more detailed
discussion of the reasons for believing that the effects of
offsetting intergenerational transfers is quantitatively small,
see Feldstein (1978). For those who remain agnostic about
the magnitude of offsetting bequests, our evidence can be
interpreted as quantifying the extent to which other reasons
cause a departure from the complete replacement predicted
by the traditional life cycle model.
II The studies to date include analyses of time series evi-
dence (Feldstein, 1974; Munnell, 1974; Barro, 1978; Darby,
1979), household survey data (Feldstein, 1976a; Kotlikoff et
al., 1977; Munnell, 1976), and cross-country data on national
savings rates (Aaron, 1967; Feldstein, 1977). A brief survey
of the available estimates is presented in Feldstein (1976b).SOCIAL SECURITY AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION 363
accumulated wealth is related by a unique func-
tion to his current net labor income. It has also
been traditional to assume that this functional
relation is one of proportionality. Consumption
during retirement is then proportional to the level
of consumption during the earlier working years.
This implies further that the value of accumu-
lated wealth on the verge of retirement is propor-
tional to that final year's earnings.
Social security provides each individual with
an annuity when he retires. In the traditional life
cycle model, the present value of that annuity
should substitute for an equal amount of private
wealth at the time of retirement. The model
therefore implies that each individual's desired
accumulation of "total wealth" including "social
security wealth" will be proportional to his final
year's net labor income:
A, + SSW,
YL,
where A1 is the value of individual i's ordinary
"fungible" wealth on the verge of retirement,
SSW, is the social security wealth (the present
actuarial value of the benefits to be provided by
social security), and YL1 is the net-of-tax labor
income in the final preretirement year.
The extended life cycle model begins with the
basic fact that the age of retirement is an en-
dogenous variable. The value of social security
wealth at some age at which retirement might be
contemplated (say, age 60) will influence the in-
dividual's retirement decision.'2 This implies
that the total wealth desired at age 60 will itself
be a function of SSW relative to YL:




Since a higher value of SSW/ YL induces earlier
retirement and therefore a larger desired stock of
total wealth, the extended life cycle model im-
plies a2 > 0.
The proportionality assumption can be relaxed
to allow the possibility that the ratio of total
retirement consumption to consumption during
working years is a function of the individual's net
labor income. This can be approximated linearly
by replacing (2) by
12Recallthat benefits are paid only to individuals who are
essentially retired.






where a3 > 0 if higher earnings induce a redis-
tribution of lifetime income in favor of older
age.'3 Multiplying both sides of (3) by YL, yields
the basic specification that will be used in our
econometric analysis:
A, + SSW, =cx1YL,+ a2SSW, + a3YL,2. (4)
This specification can be modified easily to allow
for the possibility that social security induces
changes in gifts from children to their retired
parents.
If children reduce their gifts to their parents in
proportion to the parents' receipt of social secu-
rity benefits, the value of the social security
wealth is reduced; total wealth should be written
A, + (1 —a4)SSW,rather than A. + SSW,.'4
Even if the induced changes in gifts from children
to parents are ignored, we may wish to allow for
a difference between SSW and ordinary assets
because of such things as the real annuity charac-
ter of social security or its non-contractual
character. This suggests replacing SSW, in (4) by
some multiple of SSW,, say XSS W,, where X may
be either less than or greater than 1 but is not
expected to differ from 1 by very much.
Combining all of these effects yields the spec-
ification'5









Thus,the traditional life cycle model implies p. =
1,while the effects of induced retirement (a2)
(1)
13 Feldstein(1977) presents evidence that the higher saving
rate associated with higher income levels in cross-country
data is really a reflection of the fact that retirement generally
occurs earlier in higher income countries. 'Theeffect of SSW on retirement implied by a2SSW
might also be changed to a2(l —cr4)SSW,but this implies a
particular and perhaps less plausible behavior of parents. The
two specifications are empirically indistinguishable with the
current data.'Onemight argue for X —a4instead of (1 —a4)Xbut the
distinction is essentially nonoperational.364 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
and offsetting child-parent gifts (a4) reduce this
value. The other factors included in A could
either lower or raise .Thus,a > 1 cannot be
precluded if, for example, there is little effect
through induced early retirement or changes in
intergenerational transfers but there is substan-
tial optimism about the size of benefits or a great
premium placed on the real annuity character of
social security.
It is, of course, unfortunate that the estimation
of an equation like (6) cannot identify the relative
importance of each of the parameters in (7). An
estimate of j is sufficient to answer the policy-
related question about the net effect of social
security on private saving but knowledge of the
individual parameters in (7) is required to evalu-
ate the competing theories of behavior that were
discussed in the preceding section. Although
such individual parameter estimates cannot be
obtained, the value of a can be used to assess
some of the extreme versions of these theories.
For example, the pure traditional life cycle model
implies=1while complete myopia and irra-
tionality implies .t= 0.Similarly, completely
offsetting changes in gifts from children to par-
ents (a4 =1)imply j.t￿ 0.The estimated value of icantherefore in principle help to reduce the
range of admissible theories about saving behav-
ior.
The use of a two-year average value of YL to
represent a lifetime history of net earnings and of
bequests and gifts received rests on the formal
assumption that net earnings grow exponentially
and that all other receipts are proportional to
labor income. Because we are limited by the
available data to only a two-year average for YL1,
we add a random error and a constant term to
equation (6) to indicate that (6) cannot be ex-
pected to hold precisely:
A, =a0+ a1YL1 —SSW1+ a3YL12 + u•. (8)
This is the final estimation equation used in our
econometric analysis. It should be emphasized
that our sample will be limited to households
with men between the ages of 55 and 64 so that A,
represents fungible wealth on the verge of the
normal retirement age. The sample will also be
restricted in other ways that will be described in
the next section.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile to
note that equation (8) avoids a very substantial
bias that has been a source of serious trouble in
previous tests of the traditional life cycle model
based on household data.16 The standard form of
such tests has been to estimate a saving equation
with a lagged wealth variable among the regres-
sors and observe whether its coefficient is nega-
tive.17 Since the most important source of unex-
plained variation among households (the u1's of
equation (8)) reflects permanent differences in
taste and in risk aversion, the disturbance in a
saving equation will be positively correlated with
the lagged wealth variable. This is likely to cause
a substantial bias that can account for the appar-
ently poor performance of the life cycle hypothe-
sis in previous cross-section tests. Because the
current study focuses on the equilibrium stock of
wealth rather than the annual savings flow and
uses an exogenous variable (SSW) instead of a
lagged endogenous variable, this potential source
of substantial bias is avoided.
Ill. Data and Definitions
The data used in the present research were
collected in the Federal Reserve Board's Survey
of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (Pro-
jector and Weiss, 1966) in which detailed balance
sheets and income statements were obtained
from all participants. The survey was conducted
in 1963 and refers to income in 1962 and wealth at
the end of 1962. A follow-up survey obtained
data on income in 1963. The present study uses
the subsample of households in which there was
an employed man aged 55 to 64 who was covered
by social security. Households with very low
incomes (less than half of the median) and very
high incomes (more than 2.5 times the maximum
covered by social security) were eliminated as
were those reporting substantial bequests.18
The dependent variable (A) that we have used
corresponds as closely to household net worth as
is possible with the available data. Labor income
(YL) is defined to include all income other than
income from property. It is the average of the
sum of wage and salary income, income from
16SeeProjector and Weiss (1966), Modigliani and Ando
(1957), and, more generally, the survey of studies reported in
Mayer (1972).'Alternativelya consumption function is estimated and a
positive coefficient is expected on the lagged wealth variable. 'Formore details of the sample, see section III of Feld-
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sole proprietorships, and farm income in 1962
and 1963. The amount paid in income taxes for
the two years is estimated and subtracted from
total income from these sources to give dispos-
able labor income.
The value of social security wealth was evalu-
ated for each observation in this sample. By
definition, an individual's social security wealth
is the value of the benefits for which he will be
eligible at age 65 less the taxes he will pay until
then, discounted to the present with appropriate
adjustment for actuarial survival probabilities. A
married couple's social security wealth is defined
in an analogous way. The survey data on the
separate earnings of the husband and wife and on
their ages can be used to estimate the couple's
social security wealth. The procedure has been
described indetail elsewhere(Feldstein,
1976a))9
Before turning to the econometric estimation
of the wealth accumulation equation, it is impor-
tant to recall some of the limitations of the cur-
rent data. First, we have no information on either
private pensions or life insurance. Our measure
of household assets therefore understates true
net worth and this understatement is likely to be
an increasing function of income and perhaps of
social security wealth as well. To the extent that
households substitute private pensions and life
insurance for other forms of asset accumulation,
the regression estimates will understate the ef-
fects of income on asset accumulation and over-
state the effect of social security. These biases
are likely to be relatively small because pension
coverage was relatively poor for this age cohort
of men (born in the decade from 1898 to 1907).
Second, the labor income variable bases an esti-
mate of lifetime earnings on information for only
two years. Although this would be appropriate if
each individual's earnings grew exponentially,
there is in fact substantial variation in earnings
from year to year. To the extent that this intro-
duces random measurement error in the estimate
of both YL and SSW, their coefficients will be
A full description of the current method is described in
Feldstein and Pellechio (l977) see especially the appendix.
There are a number of technical improvements over the
method used in Feldstein (l976a) but these do not alter the
general logic of the calculation presented there. The definition
used here corresponds to the net social security variable
(NSSW1) in Feldstein (1974) but the disaggregated data per-
mit the use of more detailed information.
biased; since the measurement errors are corre-
lated with each other and the two values of YL
and SSW are also correlated with each other, the
direction of the bias cannot be determined with-
out further information. Finally, it should be re-
membered that the data refer to 1963 when the
social security program was much smaller and
newer than it is today; the response of individ-
uals at that time cannot be extrapolated to the
present without considering the changes that
have occurred during the past 15 years.
IV. The Parameter Estimates
The basic parameter estimates presented in
this section imply that social security substan-
tially reduces the accumulation of household
wealth as traditionally defined. More specifically,
the point estimates generally indicate that each
dollar of social security wealth reduces fungible
net worth by somewhat less than one dollar. The
standard errors are too large to reject the implica-
tion of the traditional life cycle model that there
is dollar-for-dollar replacement, but the esti-
mates are also consistent with a rather wide
range of other replacement rates. In general,
however, the estimates are incompatible with the
hypothesis that differences among households in
social security wealth have no net effect on pri-
vate wealth accumulation.
Before looking at the parameter estimates, it is
useful to examine some characteristics of the
sample and of the population that it represents.
Our final sample contains 126 married couples
plus 12 additional households with a man who
was not married at the time of the survey. The
sampling probabilities imply that these observa-
tions represent 4.5 million couples and a total of
4.9 million households. The mean net worth of
these 4.9 million households (as of the end of
1962) was $20,801 and the corresponding stan-
dard deviation was $32,054. Their average labor
income was $5,555 with a standard deviation of
$2,806; median family income (including non-
labor income) for the entire U.S. population was
then $6,100. Traditional net worth thus averaged
about four times income. The average value of
social security wealth was $24,017, about as large
as all other household wealth; the standard de-
viation was $7,709. Finally, the men in the group
had an average age of 59 years and 89% were366 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
married. The means and standard deviations of
the income, wealth, and age variables are essen-
tially unchanged if attention is limited to couples
only.
The estimates presented below can be
classified in two ways. First, separate estimates
are presented for married couples and for all
households. The results for the sample with only
married couples are more reliable because the
group of single men probably includes men who
recently became widowers but who had accumu-
lated wealth to support a couple in retirement.
Combining couples and single men also raises the
difficult problem of comparing the life cycle
saving patterns of individuals and couples. Nev-
ertheless, estimates for all households are pre-
sented in order not to restrict the sample
unnecessarily; the combined estimates are not
substantially different from the estimates for
couples only.
Second, each equation is estimated with the
unweighted sample of observations and with the
sample weighted by the inverse of the sampling
probabilities. Weighting in this way gives more
weight to the middle income families around and
below the maximum social security earnings and
less to the higher income families. If the equation
parameters are not fixed numbers but vary
among individuals in a way that is related to
income, the coefficients derived in the weighted
regressions are more appropriate as measures of
the relevant average behavior of the population.
Moreover, since the sampling probabilities were
an increasing fraction of income, the method of
weighting is likely to produce estimates that are
statistically more efficient by reducing the prob-
lem of heteroscedasticity that arises because the
variance in the error of the household assets equa-
tion is an increasing function of income.
Equation 1 of table 1 implies that each extra
dollar of social security wealth reduces the ac-
cumulation of ordinary fungible net worth by
93g. The standard error of the coefficient (0.42)
and the caveats about the variables themselves
that were noted in section III should both caution
against giving too much weight to this or any
other specific point estimate in table 1. Instead,
these estimates must be seen collectively and as
a part of the accumulating body of evidence
based on quite different types of data.
TABLE1.—EFFECTS OFSOCIALSECURITY WEALTH ON HOUSEHOLD ASSETACCUMULATION
Equation Weighta Marriedu SSW YL (YL)2 >< 10 AYL MYL Constant R2



























































































































Note: The dependent variablein alt equations is household net worth (excluding social securily wealth). Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
LI indicates anweighted regression; W indicates regression weightedbyinverse sampling probabilities.
Equations 1 through 8 are restricted to the sample of married coaples.SOCIAL SECURITY AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION 367
Equation 2 repeats the same specification as
equation 1 but with the observations weighted by
the inverses of the sampling probabilities. The
coefficient of SSW becomes somewhat larger
than 1 but again the standard error cautions
against focusing on the specific point estimate.
The homotheticity assumption is dropped and a
quadratic income term is added in equations 3
and 4. The estimated coefficients of the social
security wealth variables are now reduced to
about 0.70; by the usual formal criteria, the
coefficients are significantly different from zero
but not significantly different from one.
Although the sample is restricted to men aged
55 to 64, it is possible that variations in age within
this range affect the accumulation of wealth. Our
failure to take this into account could in principle
be a source of bias in the remaining coefficients.
Age can affect the accumulation of wealth in a
rather complex way. The life cycle theory im-
plies that, because older men generally have
worked longer and are closer to retirement, net
worth shall increase with an individual's age.
However, the relation between wealth and age
for a cross section of individuals should not be
the same as it is over time for a single individual
or birth cohort. Even within the group of men
aged 55 to 64, such events as the Depression and
World War II came at very different ages and
therefore could be expected to have different
effects on life cycle saving. For example, the
older men were in their early thirties when the
Depression began while the younger men were
just in their early twenties; the resulting reduc-
tion in lifetime saving can therefore be expected
to be greater in the older age group. Equations 5
through 8 make a crude adjustment for the effect
of age by making the equilibrium ratio of wealth
to income (a1 of equation (1)) a linear function of
age. This is equivalent to adding a variable to the
equation that is the product of the individual's
age and labor income; AYL =AGEx YL. The
estimates in equations 5 through 8 show no statis-
tically significant effect of age and no substantial
effect on the coefficient of SS W of including the
age-income variable.
Equations 9 through 12 drop the restriction of
the sample to married couples and reestimate the
basic specification with the quadratic income
term. In the first two of these equations, a sepa-
rate adjustment is made by adding a variable
(MYL) that is equal to YL for a married couple
but otherwise equal to zero; this is equivalent to
allowing a different equilibrium wealth-income
ratio in equation (1) (i.e., a different value of a1).
Equations 9 and 10 have the surprising implica-
tion that couples accumulate less wealth than
single individuals, but the standard errors are
large relative to the coefficients •20Theestimated
effects of SSW are generally similar to the
coefficients for married couples only.
In the notation of equations (7) and (8) the
coefficient of the social security wealth variable
is=(1
—a2
—a4)X,where (1) an induced
retirement effect of social security on saving im-
plies a2 > 0, (2) induced changes in child-to-
parent transfers that tend to offset the effect of
social security imply a4> 0, and (3) such differ-
ences between social security wealth and ordi-
nary wealth as fungibility and inflation protection
imply It1. The estimates of p approximately
equal to I and significantly different from 0 indi-
cate that it is very unlikely that social security
induces changes in either child-to-parent trans-
fers or retirement plans that substantially negate
the direct effect of social security on savings.
The specific combination of a's and A corre-
sponding to the estimated value of j obviously
cannot be identified on the basis of the available
evidence.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, we wish only to reiterate that
the parameter estimates presented in this paper
should not be seen in isolation but as part of a
larger body of evidence on life cycle savings be-
havior in general and on the effects of social
security on saving in particular. We are as con-
scious as anyone of the limitations of the current
data and of the problems of interpreting our re-
sults. We believe, however, that the current es-
timates do support the validity of the life cycle
approach and of the specific conclusion that so-
cial security significantly depresses private
wealth accumulation. Significant improvements
in microeconometric analysis of this question
must await the development of data combining
accurate records of lifetime earnings, social se-
curity wealth, and private net worth.
20Thedifference between couples and single individuals
may also reflect the role of life insurance.368
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